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IP REMEDIES AFTER EBA Y" ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON
TRADEMARK LAW
Sandra Rierson *
The Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L. C. 1 changed the law regarding remedies in patent cases - specifically
the "general rule... that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged.",2  Prior to eBay, the
Federal Circuit held that injunctive relief was an inappropriate remedy
for patent infringement only in a narrow category of cases in which
enjoining an infringer would frustrate an important public interest.3 The
Supreme Court rejected that assumption, holding instead that plaintiffs
seeking this form of remedy for patent infringement were required to
satisfy the traditional, four-factor test for injunctive relief.4 Plaintiffs in
such cases must now prove that (1) they have suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) legal remedies, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for the injury; (3) the balance of hardships weighs in their
* Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I would like to thank all of the participants
in the First Annual IP Forum at the University of Akron School of Law and the Thomas Jefferson
School of Law Junior Faculty Writing Workshop for their helpful comments and feedback on this
article. I would particularly like to thank Julie Cromer, Deven Desai, Anders Kaye, Shaun Martin,
and Jeff Slattery for their insights and support, and Chelsea Hueth for her outstanding research
assistance.
1. 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
2. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by
126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing cases).
4. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. For a thorough summary and analysis of the eBay opinion, see
Sue Ann Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: Traditional Four-Factor Test for Injunctive Relief Applies
to Patent Cases, According to the Supreme Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529 (2007); see also Todd
Klein, Comment, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court
Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 295, 302-09 (2007); Miranda Jones,
Casenote, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name is Patently Not the Same: How
eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Rights of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 1035, 1054-59 (2007).
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favor; and (4) granting an injunction will not negatively impact the
public interest.
5
What, then - if anything - is the potential impact of eBay on
trademark law? In trademark law, like patent law (at least prior to the
eBay decision), the case law reflects a strong presumption that injunctive
relief goes hand-in-hand with a finding of liability - either in the form of
trademark infringement or, more recently, dilution. In fact, in trademark
law injunctive relief is the preferred form of remedy, as courts have been
unwilling to award monetarydamages except in cases of willful and/or
particularly egregious misconduct, when injunctive relief would not be a
satisfactory form of relief.6 Specifically, the "irreparable harm" element
of the traditional test for injunctive relief is generally presumed in both
trademark infringement and dilution cases, provided the plaintiff can
prove liability.
7
5. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
6. See, e.g., Synergistic Int'l., LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2006) ("If an
injunction is an adequate remedy, this factor should weigh against a damages award."); see also
Tamko Roofing Prod. Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., Ltd., 282 F.3d 23, 35 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[I]f
injunctive relief provides a complete and adequate remedy, then the equities of the case may not
require an accounting of profits."); Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 256 F.3d 1050, 1055
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an accounting of profits should be determined by "equitable
considerations" in order to deter willful violations); Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter,
Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that "an accounting will be denied with a
trademark infringement action where an injunction will satisfy the equities of the case") (citations
omitted); Malletier v. Dooney & Burke Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d. 276, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (upholding
the view that "a finding of willfulness is a prerequisite to awarding profits in trademark
infringement actions"), reconsideration denied, No. 04 Civ. 2990(SAS), 2007 WL 1498323
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2007).
7. See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726 (3rd Cir. 2004) (holding
that a plaintiff who has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark infringement
claim "is entitled to a presumption that it will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction"); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Irreparable harm is
generally presumed in cases of trademark infringement and dilution."); Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and
Neurology, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[B]y its very nature, trademark
infringement results in irreparable harm" (quoting Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa
Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 640 (1st Cir. 1992))); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124
F.3d 137, 142 (2nd Cir. 1997) ("In the context of trademark and unfair competition injunctions, the
requirement of irreparable harm carries no independent weight, as .. .a showing of likelihood of
confusion ... establishes irreparable harm."); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va.,
Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 938 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A finding of irreparable injury ordinarily follows when a
likelihood of confusion or possible risk to reputation appears.") (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way
Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1991)); Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d
819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In trademark cases, once the plaintiff establishes a likelihood of
confusion between the plaintiff's mark and the defendant's, it is ordinarily presumed the plaintiff
will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted."); Perry Ellis Int'l, Inc. v. Uri Corp.,
No. 06-22020-CIV, 2007 WL 3047143, at *7 (S.D. Fla., Oct. 18, 2007) (holding that "by virtue of
[defendant's] trademark infringement, Plaintiffs have also established irreparable harm and no
adequate remedy at law"); Quantum Fitness Corp. v. Quantum LifeStyle Canters, L.L.C., 83 F.
[2:163164
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In the traditional trademark infringement case - one in which the
defendant "passes off' his goods as those of the plaintiff - this remedial
presumption intuitively makes sense. Both the injury to the public, who
may have been tricked into buying defendant's inferior goods by his
tortious imitation of plaintiffs mark, and the injury to the trademark
holder, whose goodwill is consequently put at risk, will be difficult to
measure and to undo. However, as trademark law has drifted from its
moorings in the common law of unfair competition and morphed into a
property-like right of the holder, the extent to which the presumption of
irreparable harm8 still applies should be questioned. Particularly in cases
which reflect a broader, propertized version of trademark law,
application of eBay's mandate that courts review the merits of a request
for injunctive relief,9 rather than rely upon formulaic assumptions to
support the award of such relief, would be an improvement over the
status quo.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN EBAY
The Supreme Court's decision in eBay at least facially derives from
statutory interpretation of the Patent Act.'0 The Court reasoned that the
Patent Act explicitly incorporates "well-established principles of equity"
- the four-factor test mentioned above - via the following language:
"The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent
the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
deems reasonable."'" The Court pointed out that, in the copyright
context as well, it has "consistently rejected invitations to replace
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination [of infringement]. 12  The
Supreme Court held that both the Federal Circuit and the district court
had incorrectly applied the four-factor test, and reversed and remanded
on that basis.' 3 Although the Court did not give any specific guidance as
to the manner in which the four-factor test should be applied by the
Supp. 2d. 810, 831 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ("When a likelihood of confusion exists, the plaintiffs lack of
control over the quality of the defendant's goods or services constitutes an immediate and
irreparable injury.")
8. See supra notes 6-7.
9. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1841.
10. Id. at 1839-40.
11. Id. at 1839 & n.2 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283).
12. Id. at 1840 (citing cases).
13. Id. at 1841.
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district courts, in concluding his concurrence Chief Justice Roberts
writes somewhat cryptically that "[w]hen it comes to discerning and
applying those standards [presumably the four-factor test discussed in
the majority opinion]... a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 14
A. The Roberts Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts implies that the
impact of the eBay opinion in the realm of patent law should not be that
great, both due to (1) the long history of precedent holding that an
injunction is an appropriate remedy for patent infringement; and (2) the
logic underlying those cases. 15 He notes that "[f]rom at least the early
19 th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases."' 16 Furthermore, he
reasons that this result is not a surprising one, "given the difficulty of
protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an
infringer to use an invention against the patentee's wishes. . . .,1" Chief
Justice Roberts also extols the value of precedent and cautions that eBay
should not be interpreted as giving district courts "an entirely clean
slate" on which to write their analysis of remedies in patent infringement
cases.' 8 In other words, even if the courts eschew a presumption of
irreparable harm in favor of applying the four-factor test for equitable
relief, they should probably reach the same result - granting an
injunction to the plaintiff who proves infringement - at least in the vast
majority of cases.
B. The Kennedy Concurrence
If Chief Justice Roberts is correct that eBay's clarification of the
equitable standard for relief in patent cases is, as a practical matter,
unlikely to affect many decisions, the question arises as to why the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case in the first place. The
Court does not often agree to hear a case merely to make an academic
point about statutory interpretation and principles of equity. The answer,
as least as suggested by Justice Kennedy's concurrence, seems to be that
the eBay decision reflects the Court's concern about a significant subset
14. Id. at 1842 (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
15. Id. at 1841 (Roberts, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts' concurrence was joined by
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg.
16. Id.
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of patent cases - cases in which the plaintiff is a "patent troll" 19 and
cases involving business method patents - and further that the Court
anticipates that application of eBay's reasoning could potentially affect
the result in such cases. In these contexts, Justice Kennedy hints that
"district courts must determine whether past practice fits the
circumstances of the cases before them. 2°
Although the majority opinion in eBay primarily focuses on the
language of the Patent Act, Justice Kennedy's concurrence puts the case
in the context of public policy concerns currently surrounding patent
law. eBay is one of a trio of recent cases narrowly construing the rights
of patent holders 21 that may have the intended effect of reigning in a
class of patent holders known pejoratively as "patent trolls. 22 Although
this term appears in not a single Supreme Court case, Justice Kennedy
alludes to the patent troll when he refers to "an industry... in which
firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but,
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees."
23
The "patent troll," characterized by one commentator as "the
ubermensch of patent litigation, 24 has been described as follows:
Proponents assert that patent trolls are entitled to extract value
from underutilized patented technologies. Critics contend that
they are the ambulance chasers of the new millennium. Patent
trolls have inverted the traditional rationale for building an
intellectual property ("IP") portfolio. They obtain patents, not to
make, use, or sell new products and technologies, but solely to
force third parties to purchase licenses. Instead of investing
capital to develop inventions, patent trolls wait for the industry
to utilize a patented technology and then enforce their patents on
19. See infra note 22.
20. Id. at 1841-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.
21. See also, KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007) (expanding the definition of
obviousness as a bar to patentability); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007)
(holding that patent licensee may seek declaratory judgment as to validity and/or noninfringement
of patent without terminating or breaching license agreement with patent holder).
22. See generally, Todd Klein, Comment, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int'l Co. V.
Teleflex, Inc.. The Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295,
297-302 (2007); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1814-19 (2007); Peter Detkin, Leveling the Patent
Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636 (2007); Leslie T. Grab, Equitable
Concerns of eBay v. MercExchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent
Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 81, 83-87 (2006).
23. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. James M. Fischer, The "Right" to Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 24 Santa
Clara Comp. & High Tech. L. J. 1, 2 (2007).
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the alleged infringers. And because patent trolls have no
incentive to reach business solutions, target companies are left
with two options: pay up or litigate.
Although the Court did not hold that an injunction should never
issue when a patent holder seeks to license rather than practice its
patents - in fact it rejected this proposition2 6 - it did pave the way for
the argument that trolls' recovery should be limited to a reasonable
royalty on their inventions, rather than large sums of money reflecting
their ability to enjoin the sale of the alleged infringer's goods or
services.
27
The Kennedy concurrence also takes aim at business method
patents, noting that "[t]he potential vagueness and suspect validity of
some of these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor
test,,, 21 also presumably reducing the likelihood that prevailing
plaintiffs/owners of business method patents would automatically be
entitled to injunctive relief.
C. The Impact of eBay in Patent Infringement Cases
A survey of district court decisions following eBay reflects that
eBay has had a significant impact on the manner in which injunctive
relief is calculated in patent law cases, at least in the types of cases
identified in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. 29 Although the Court in
eBay provided little guidance as to how the four-factor test should be
applied to determine when an injunction is warranted (e.g., the quantum
of evidence required to prove any of the factors and how the factors
should be weighed and balanced), it did suggest that "categorical
rule[s]" and presumptions should be abandoned in favor of a case-by-
case analysis of the factors, which must be proved by the
plaintiff/patent-holder seeking an injunction.30 Most importantly, eBay
25. Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 1, 1 (2005) (citations omitted).
26. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840.
27. See, e.g., Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay v. MercExchange
Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 334-35 (2007) (describing litigation between Research in
Motion (RIM), maker of the BlackBerry, a popular hand-held electronic device, and alleged patent
troll NTP, Inc., which resulted in a settlement of $612 million paid to NTP largely to avoid a
permanent injunction).
28. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
29. See generally Benjamin H. Diessel, Trolling for Trolls: The Piyfalls of the Emerging
Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH.
L. REv. 305 (2007) (examining and critiquing district court cases post-eBay).
30. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840-41.
[2:163
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has arguably dislodged the presumption of irreparable and
incompensable harm - at least with regard to requests for permanent
injunctive relief - that formerly accompanied a finding of patent
infringement. 31  As a result, many post-eBay courts have refused to
award injunctive relief to the patent holder as a remedy for patent
infringement, particularly in cases when s/he can arguably be classified
as a "troll," i.e., the plaintiff/patent holder does not use or practice the
patent.
32
1I. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EBAYON TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
AND DILUTION
Trademark infringement and dilution - like patent infringement in
the pre-eBay era - typically carry the presumption of irreparable harm
that cannot be compensated via monetary relief.33  Even though
trademark and patent law have largely divergent theoretical
underpinnings, in the remedial context they share more similarities than
differences. Like patent law, trademark law has expanded in scope in
recent years, prompting concern on the part of courts and commentators
as to the negative public policy impacts of over-reaching by rights
holders. Particularly in these types of cases, eBay should be applied to
limit or modify the scope of injunctive relief made available to
prevailing plaintiffs.
A. Comparing trademark and patent law: divergences and parallels
Trademarks are generally treated as distinct from the two other
primary forms of intellectual property, patents and copyrights, and for
good reason.34 In sum, patent and copyright law grant the holder of the
31. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568-569 (E.D. Va.
2007) (on remand; presumption of irreparable harm "no longer exists"); IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree,
LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D. Del. 2007) (plaintiff failed to prove irreparable harm and
inadequacy of money damages, noting that plaintiff had previously licensed the relevant patent);
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443-44 (D. Del. 2007) (plaintiff failed to prove
irreparable harm and inadequacy of money damages and therefore was not entitled to permanent
injunction); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(plaintiff has burden of proving irreparable injury); see also Diessel, supra note 3 1, at 327-29
(arguing that district courts have largely refused to find irreparable harm, post-eBay, when plaintiffs
have not commercialized their inventions, thereby making it impossible for such plaintiffs to obtain
injunctive relief).
32. See supra note 22.
33. See supra note 7.
34. See generally, Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1799-1801 (2007); cf David W. Barnes, A New
7
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intellectual property a greater degree of dominion over it than is present
in trademark law, for a shorter period of time. Patent and copyright
holders are essentially and temporarily granted rights "in gross"-that is,
the holder of the intellectual property has exclusive control over it and
generates capital based on that control for a finite period of time.35 This
notion is enshrined in the Constitution, which empowers Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 36 In contrast, trademark law has
no explicit Constitutional mandate but instead arises from the common
law tort of unfair competition.37 Trademarks also do not expire after a
set period of time, but instead endure so long as the mark holder
continues to use the mark, potentially in perpetuity.38 As a result, a
fundamental tenet of trademark law has always been that, unlike
copyrights and patents, trademarks are not held in gross and therefore
the trademark holder's right to prohibit others' use of the mark is not
absolute, and is limited to those instances in which such use would harm
the mark owner and/or the public. 39  At least in some respects, these
theoretical distinctions between trademark and patent law should
strengthen rather than undermine the argument that eBay alters the
standard for granting injunctive relief in trademark cases.
Unlike trademarks, patents have long been considered a form of
property.40 Ownership of property encompasses the right to exclude,
Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22 (2006) (arguing that the differences
between copyrights and patents on the one hand and trademarks on the other are not as stark as is
often presented, but rather that, like copyrights and patents, trademarks are public goods with non-
rivalrous characteristics and must be understood as such "to supply an optimal amount of
information about products and their sources").
35. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1041 (2005). The extent to which the patent holder continues to exercise "exclusive" power
over his patent after eBay remains to be seen.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
37. See generally, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166 (2003).
38. The Lanham Act provides that owners of federally-registered trademarks may maintain
their registrations by filing a renewal application (attesting to continued use) and paying a specified
fee every ten years. There is no limit on the number of times mark owners may renew their
trademark registrations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (2005).
39. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) ("In truth, a
trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for
facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol -
a commercial signature - upon the merchandise or package in which it is sold."); accord Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413-14 (1916).
40. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) ("That a patent is
property, protected against appropriation . .., has long been settled."); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v.
[2:163
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one of the "most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.' As noted by Chief Justice
Roberts, it is difficult to protect a right to exclude through any remedy
other than exclusion.4 2 The alternative - a monetary remedy in the form
of royalties - necessarily "allow[s] an infringer to use an invention
against the patentee's wishes," which directly contravenes a right to
exclude.43 By contrast, trademark holders have never exercised rights
"in gross" over their trademarks. Moreover, although many holders of
trademarks undoubtedly consider and treat their marks as valuable
pieces of intellectual property, their status as such is not settled and has
been roundly criticized.4  Therefore, as a general policy matter,
trademark cases seem to be even more amenable to eBay's lesson that
irreparable, incompensable injury should not be presumed, and that the
plaintiff at all time bears the burden of proving that s/he is entitled to
injunctive relief.
The language of the Lanham Act, the federal statute that anchors
modem trademark law, also supports the conclusion that eBay should
apply in trademark as well as patent cases. In eBay, the Supreme Court
held that any categorical rule or presumption of an entitlement to an
injunction "should not be lightly implied" and was not warranted under
the language of the Patent Act, which provides that "injunctions may
issue in accordance with the principles of equity., 45  The Lanham Act
contains almost identical language, specifying that the courts
adjudicating rights under it "shall have power to grant injunctions,
Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) ("A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for
land."); see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) ("[Piatents shall have the attributes of personal property.");
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (patent confers upon the patentee "the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States....")
41. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Schenck v. Nortron
Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others,
the very definition of 'property."').
42. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, J.,
concurring). Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined in Chief Justice Roberts' concurrence.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g.. Desai & Rierson, supra note 36, at 1801-05 (discussing trademarks' capacity for
expressive use, which may be limited by overly expansive trademark protections); Lemley, supra
note 37, at 1032 (arguing that use of "[t]he rhetoric of real property, with its condemnation of 'free
riding' by those who imitate or compete with intellectual property owners," has resulted in "a legal
regime for intellectual property... in which courts seek out and punish virtually any use of an
intellectual property right by another"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 406-10 (1990)
(tracing the shift to a pure property approach to trademark rights and noting the way in which this
shift limits the potential for expressive use of trademarks).
45. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283).
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according to principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may
deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of [rights under the Act]."46
The language of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act ("TDRA") is
slightly different. The TDRA specifies that "[s]ubject to the principles
of equity, the owner of a famous mark... shall be entitled to an
injunction against another person who... commences use of a mark...
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution... of the famous
mark.... ,47 On its face, the language of the statute may be read to
suggest that courts may be compelled to issue injunctions when dilution
has been found, as it states that the mark owner "shall be entitled to an
injunction" against a defendant whose use of that mark is "likely to
cause dilution.' '48  However, the statute also states that this right is
"[s]ubject to the principles of equity,' '49 arguably incorporating the same
equitable principles that the Supreme Court applied to the Patent Act in
eBay. 50  Moreover, although the statute does use mandatory language
when referring to the "entitlement" to an injunction, the statute also
contains affirmative defenses that would prohibit the court from issuing
one, under certain circumstances. 5' On balance, a fair reading of this
seemingly contradictory language in the statute supports the conclusion
that, in dilution cases as well as trademark infringement actions,
Congress did not intend to abrogate the courts' traditional power to
utilize their discretion in fashioning equitable remedies.52
46. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Although the Lanham Act
uses the word "shall" in this section instead of "may," as used in the Patent Act, taken in context
both statutes communicate the idea that the relevant court has the power to issue injunctive relief
but is not compelled to do so. The Lanham Act specifies that the court "shall have the power to
grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity," 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(a) (emphasis added),
while the Patent Act states that the court "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity," 35 U.S.C. § 283 (emphasis added).
47. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. See generally, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
51. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(3)(A)-(C) (2006) (identifying and excluding from liability
"[a]ny fair use" or "[a]ny noncommercial use" of a mark, including uses of the mark in comparative
advertising or as a parody, criticism or comment upon the owner of the famous mark and/or her
goods or services).
52. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) ("[W]e should not construe a statute to
displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command. . . or an inescapable
inference to the contrary .. ") (citations omitted); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 69 (1992) ("[l1f a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and Congress is silent on the
question of remedies, a federal court may order any appropriate relief."); Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is
to be recognized and applied."); Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 749 (D.C. Cir.
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B. eBay's effect on trademark infringement remedies
The test for injunctive relief mandated by the Court in eBay
requires courts to weigh the following four factors: (1) irreparable injury
to the party seeking the injunction; (2) proof that legal remedies, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for the injury; (3) the
relative balance of hardships; and (4) the impact of granting an
injunction on the public interest. 53 The party seeking injunctive relief
has the burden of proof as to each of these factors.5 4 In most trademark
infringement cases - both pre- and post-eBay - the courts presume
irreparable injury and inadequacy of monetary damages once trademark
infringement has been proven.5 Moreover, once these conclusions have
been made, the analysis of the other factors, to the extent it exists, tends
to fall in line accordingly. Under eBay, courts assessing injunctive relief
in trademark infringement cases should no longer engage in such
perfunctory analysis.
1. Irreparable harm and inadequacy of damages at law
As stated previously, once the plaintiff in a trademark case proves a
"likelihood of confusion" between her trademark and the mark being
used by defendant, the courts are likely to presume, as a matter of law,
that the plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury that cannot be
adequately compensated via money damages.5 6 One theory behind this
presumption is that the intangible harm caused by trademark
infringement, "by its very nature," is almost impossible to measure:
"[T]rademark infringement results in irreparable harm because the
attendant loss of profits, goodwill, and reputation cannot be satisfactorily
quantified, and, thus, the trademark owner cannot adequately be
1995) ("[C]ourts are presumed to possess the full range of remedial powers - legal as well as
equitable - unless Congress expressly restricted their exercise.").
53. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 7.
56. Id., but cf Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy's, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming
district court's refusal to grant permanent injunction, despite showing of trademark infringement;
noting that presumption of irreparable harm "was not intended to swallow the remaining prongs of
the permanent injunction inquiry"); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, No. 06-1115, 2007 WL
39207, at *3 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (affirming district court's refusal to grant preliminary
injunction, based on plaintiff's inability to demonstrate irreparable harm); MyGym, LLC v. Engle,
No. 1:06-CV-130 TC, 2006 WL 3524474, at *10 (D. Utah 2006) (refusing to grant preliminary
injunction and finding that plaintiff could not demonstrate irreparable harm) (citing eBay 126 S.Ct.
1837).
11
Rierson: IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
compensated., 57 Moreover, the harm caused by trademark infringement
- consumer confusion, or the likelihood thereof - is theoretically
difficult to undo.58 Some courts have reasoned that the most "corrosive
and irreparable harm attributable to trademark infringement is the
inability of the victim to control the nature and quality of the defendants'
goods., 59 Therefore, even when the infringer's goods or services are of
high quality - perhaps even higher than those of the trademark holder
herself - irreparable injury has nonetheless occurred, due to the
trademark holder's loss of the ability to control her own destiny.
60
The accuracy of these presumptions is highly questionable, at least
in certain contexts. First, courts should not accept without question the
notion that the trademark holder's goodwill is so ethereal and intangible
that damage done to it via infringement is simply incalculable.
"Goodwill" associated with a trademark ideally consists of a "pervasive
favorable reputation with consumers based on countless pleasant
experiences that they have had with both product and personnel.",
61
When it needs to be quantified or valued as an asset, "goodwill" or
"brand equity" is typically defined as "the price premium the brand
commands times the extra volume it moves over an average brand. 62 In
other words, the value of a brand is expressed when a company realizes
a net worth greater than its tangible asset value. 63  When the mega-
brands calculate goodwill in this manner, the resulting values can be
astonishing: Coca-Cola, Microsoft and IBM have been valued at $67.5
billion, $59.9 billion and $53.3 billion, respectively. 64  The goodwill
57. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. v. Johnson-Powell, 129 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
1997); see also Abbot Lab. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 27 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[lIt is virtually
impossible to ascertain the precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to
reputation and loss of goodwill.").
58. See General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1987).
59. Re/Max N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Int'l Kennel
Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1988)).
60. Id. ("Even if the infringer's products are of high quality, the plaintiff can property insist
that its reputation should not be imperiled by the acts of another.) (quoting Int'l Kennel Club of
Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092 (7th Cir. 1988)).
61. See Warren E. Buffet, The Essays of Warren Buffet. Lessons for Corporate America, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 173 (1997) (selected, arranged, and introduced by Lawrence E. Cunningham);
see also Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment with Goodwill: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone,
57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 799-814 (2005) (discussing and defining the concept of goodwill).
62. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 405 (2000). Other brand valuation methods
are used in the marketing industry as well. See Jacques Chevron, Valuing Brands, on Paper and in
Truth, BRANDWEEK, Jan. 17, 2000, at 24.
63. Similarly, brand value has been expressed as "excess of cost over equity in net assets
acquired." Buffet, supra note 65, at 172-73.
64. Global Brands, BUSINESS WEEK, July 2005, at 90. Business Week's annual global brand
report ranks the top one hundred global brands by dollar value, estimating the amount the brand is
[2:163
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associated with a brand may be auctioned off as a company's primary
asset in bankruptcy proceedings.65 Companies benefitting from goodwill
or brand equity as a tangible asset on their balance sheets should not be
allowed to skirt the requirements for proving injunctive relief, solely on
the theory that they cannot place a price tag on their goodwill.
Admittedly, isolating the reason for a decline in a company's
goodwill or brand value is likely to be difficult, particularly when the
task is to trace such a decline to a particular instance of trademark
infringement. That difficulty, however, is no excuse for treating all
cases of trademark infringement as though they were created equal.
When a competitor places a trademark holder's mark (or a confusingly
similar replication of it) on the competitor's inferior goods, thereby
generating a likelihood of confusion on the part of the consumer, one
would expect such conduct to have a real impact on (1) the consumer's
opinion of the trademark holder's goods; and (2) the sales of those
goods. However, trademark law has expanded well beyond this classic
example of infringement. Many types of conduct that currently fall
under the label of "infringement" actually do little to impair the overall
value of the mark.
Cases falling under the doctrine of "initial interest confusion, 66 - in
which there is no confusion by the consumer at the point of sale -
provide a prime example of trademark infringement in which the level of
actual injury to the trademark holder is likely to be negligible. Initial
interest confusion may best be described as a type of false advertising.
In a classic example, a highway sign points to a particular fast food
restaurant, e.g., Wendy's. When the consumer follows the sign,
however, she discovers that it leads to a different fast food restaurant,
e.g., Burger King, with no Wendy's in sight. Even though she knows
she is at Burger King, not Wendy's, the consumer is hungry and
therefore eats at Burger King; she is unwilling and/or unable to invest
the time and effort necessary to locate a Wendy's at this point. This
likely to earn in the future. Id.
65. For example, in 2006 Iconix Brand Group, Inc. paid $37 million for the London Fog
brand as an asset in London Fog's bankruptcy proceeding. That same year, lconix paid $135
million for the Mossimo brand; $88 million for Mudd; and $54 million for Ocean Pacific. Iconix
Brand Group, Inc., HOOVER'S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, 2007 WLNR 25041277 (12/19/07).
66. See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (9th
Cir. 2004) (discussing theory of initial interest confusion); Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. West Coast
Enter. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-65 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing theory of initial interest
confusion); see generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005) (critiquing the doctrine of initial
interest confusion). At least in the Internet context, the initial interest confusion doctrine has had
limited application outside the Ninth Circuit.
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doctrine had a relatively limited application until it gained notoriety and
significance as a vehicle for preventing "misuse" of a trademark on the
Internet. When a competitor uses a trademark holder's mark as a
metatag, the consumer who enters that trademark as a search term
(arguably in an attempt to find the trademark holder's Web site) may be
presented with a pop-up ad for the competitor's goods or services or a
link to the competitor's Web site. In some cases the courts have held
that this conduct constitutes trademark infringement via initial interest
confusion.67 As in the highway analogy described above, the consumer
may be misdirected to the competitor when she was actually looking for
the trademark holder. However, the cost associated with correcting a
mistake on the Internet - if one was made in the first place - is minute.
If the consumer finds himself on the wrong Web site, he can simply
click back to where he started. Moreover, the consumer may not be
confused at all; he may be choosing among an array of options presented
when he entered the trademark as a search term. In other words, the
consumer may be benefitting from competition rather than suffering
from confusion.68 In any event, even charitably interpreted, these types
of cases are not likely to impair the goodwill associated with the
trademark holder's mark in any meaningful way.
Undoubtedly, when compared to a typical case of patent
infringement - particularly when the patent holder is an alleged "patent
troll" who makes money by licensing a portfolio of patents - calculating
monetary damages in a case of trademark infringement is much more
difficult. However, in both patent and trademark cases, an intangible
right is at stake: in the patent case, the patentee's right to exclude; in the
trademark case, the trademark holder's right to control the fate of the
goodwill associated with his mark. In both types of cases, the value of
the right will vary, as will the value of its impairment, depending on the
facts of the particular case. Therefore, in trademark as well as patent
cases, eBay's mandate to avoid formulaic approaches to the assessment
of injunctive relief should eliminate the presumption that a trademark
holder has, as a matter of law, proven irreparable injury merely by
67. See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc., 354 F.3d 1020 (competitor pop-up ads); Brookfield
Comme 'n, Inc., 174 F.3d 1036 (sponsored links to competitor Web sites).
68. See Playboy Enter., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring); see also Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L.
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showing a likelihood of confusion sufficient to demonstrate trademark
infringement. 69
2. The balance of hardships
Courts deciding trademark infringement actions sometimes (but not
always) weigh the competing hardships when determining whether to
issue permanent injunctive relief.70  Once a plaintiff demonstrates a
likelihood of confusion (or a likelihood of success on this issue),
however, courts rarely find the presumed irreparable harm to be
outweighed by any potential harm to the defendant.7' In light of eBay,
courts deciding trademark infringement cases should take a harder look
at this factor when determining entitlement to injunctive relief, and the
defacto presumption in favor of the plaintiff seeking such relief should
be eliminated.
When the plaintiff has demonstrated actual success on the merits in
a trademark infringement case - based on a showing of likelihood of
confusion - courts typically devote very little analysis to the "balance of
the hardships" when deciding whether to award permanent injunctive
relief.72 When the court finds that defendant has intentionally infringed
plaintiff's trademark, a permanent injunction routinely issues, and
defendant's interest, if mentioned, is given no weight.73 In the relatively
rare case in which the district court has refused to grant a permanent
69. Although a handful of courts have suggested that eBay may apply in trademark
infringement cases, none to date have held that eBay mandates the elimination of the irreparable and
incompensable harm presumption. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, No. 06-1115, 2007 WL
39207, at 3 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished), the Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether eBay
required the courts to abandon the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases.
It held, however, that under the facts presented the plaintiff had failed to show that the harm it
would suffer in the absence of an injunction (presumed or not) would outweigh potential harm to
the defendant if the injunction were granted. Id. In Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d
1161, 1168 (D. Utah 2007), the district court noted that the Supreme Court "recently disapproved
the use of categorical rules in connection with injunctive relief in intellectual property actions," but
then required no proof, other than Plaintiff's evidence of goodwill acquired in the mark "Chem-
Dry," to substantiate irreparable injury due to defendant's alleged infringement. Id. See also, Audi
AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying eBay in trademark infringement,
dilution, and anti-cybersquatting context).
70. See infra note 72.
71. See infra notes [76-78 and accompanying text] 69.
72. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Service Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1991)
(solely discussing irreparable injury in context of reviewing permanent injunction for trademark
infringement); Perry Ellis Int'l, Inc. v. Uri Corp., No. 06-22020-CIV, 2007 WL 3047143, at 6 (S.D.
Fla., Oct. 18, 2007) (solely discussing (1) success on the merits; (2) lack of adequate remedy at law;
and (3) irreparable harm, in context of reviewing permanent injunction for trademark infringement).
73. See, e.g., Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 550 (noting that defendant "faces no hardship in refraining
from willful trademark infringement").
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injunction, despite a finding of infringement, the court characterizes
defendants as innocent or accidental infringers with no desire or plan to
continue infringement of plaintiffs trademark.74
Although it is easy to see why district courts are unsympathetic to
the plight of the willful infringer, intent to infringe is but one factor
considered by courts in determining whether liability exists in a
trademark infringement case. 75  Many findings of liability are not
accompanied by a finding of wrongful or bad faith intent on the part of
the defendant.76 In the many cases in which defendant has not intended
to copy plaintiffs trademark, or "pass off' his goods as those of the
trademark owner, courts should seriously consider whether the
traditional form of permanent injunctive relief - forcing defendant to
change the name of her goods or services - is warranted, particularly
when the alleged harm inflicted on the plaintiff by infringement is, in
fact, relatively minor.
Initial interest confusion cases, as discussed above, present a prime
opportunity for district courts to utilize their discretion to balance the
hardships between the parties by creatively structuring injunctive relief.
If, for example, a competitor is found to have infringed a trademark by
using it as a metatag, thereby generating an advertisement or a link to the
competitor's Web site, the court could balance the hardships more
effectively by ordering some relief other than prohibiting use of the
mark altogether in this context. As noted above, use of trademarks as
metatags has the beneficial effect of promoting competition by giving
the consumer access to information about competitors (either in the form
of an advertisement or a link to the competitor's Web site) in addition to
74. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy's, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming
district court's refusal to grant permanent injunction where defendant unintentionally sold
counterfeit Gucci bags that were expensive, well-made, and virtually indistinguishable from
authentic Gucci merchandise).
75. See, e.g., Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2004) (listing seven factors
to be considered in analyzing likelihood of confusion in the context of a trademark infringement
claim, including "the defendant's intent to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiff"); AMF, Inc.
v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing eight factors to be considered in
analyzing likelihood of confusion in the context of a trademark infringement claim, including
"defendant's intent in selecting the mark"); cf Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1626-31 (2006) (arguing, based on
empirical analysis, that, while a finding of bad faith intent is not necessary to support a claim of
trademark infringement, such a finding effectively creates an almost irrebuttable presumption of
infringement).
76. In his empirical study of trademark infringement cases, Professor Barton Beebe found that
only about 64% of the cases in which the court determined that a trademark was infringed also
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information about the trademark holder. Restricting access to this
avenue for competition harms the defendant as well as the public. Any
attendant confusion could be dispelled by the use of conspicuous
disclaimers and/or links directing the consumer back to the trademark
holder's Web site. Similarly, a court could order that any competitor
advertisements generated by use of a trademark be clearly labeled as
advertisements of the competitor and not the trademark holder.
77
Currently, district courts rarely engage in meaningful analysis of
the competing harms suffered by the parties in a trademark infringement
context. 78 In a nutshell, when plaintiff demonstrates that she is likely to
prevail on the issue of likelihood of confusion, most courts presume that
the plaintiff has been irreparably and incompensably harmed, and that
harm is rarely outweighed by any interest on the part of the defendant.79
In light of eBay, courts should not presume that the balance of hardships
tips in the plaintiffs favor, nor should they consider themselves
powerless to mitigate harm via the structuring of injunctive relief. While
the facts may well support the conclusion that a prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to the traditional form of injunctive relief - an absolute
prohibition of defendant's use of the infringing mark - others may merit
a different result.
3. The public interest
The final factor to be considered in assessing injunctive relief,
according to the Supreme Court in eBay, is the impact that granting the
injunction will have on the public interest. 80 Although most courts
77. See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (arguing that use of a trademark as a keyword to generate banner
advertisements should not constitute trademark infringement via initial interest confusion if the
resulting ads are clearly labeled as those of the competitor, not the trademark holder).
78. See, e.g., Re/Max N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2001) (where
plaintiff demonstrated likelihood of confusion and irreparable harm, balance of harms also found to
weigh in its favor); Int'l Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993)
(where plaintiff failed to demonstrate likelihood of confusion and irreparable harm, balance of
hardship was found to weigh in favor of the defendant); Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F.
Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (D. Utah 2007) (where plaintiff demonstrated likelihood of confusion and
irreparable harm, court found no evidence of any potential damages to defendant as a result of
preliminary injunction); Minnesota Mining and Manuf'g Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005
(D. Minn. 1998) (same); but see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, No. 06-1115, 2007 WL 39207, at
3 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (affirming district court decision to deny preliminary injunctive
relief); MyGym, LLC v. Engle, No. 1:06-CV-130 TC, 2006 WL 3524474, at 10 (D. Utah 2006)
(refusing to grant preliminary injunction and finding that balance of harms weighed in defendant's
favor).
79. See supra note 81.
80. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
17
Rierson: IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
recognize that the public interest is a factor to be considered when
assessing a request for injunctive relief in a trademark case, typically
very little analysis is devoted to this factor." Most courts simply
presume that consumers benefit from injunctive relief.8 2 Although the
courts often do not explain the basis for this presumption, it can logically
be tied to the underlying nature of trademark law, a primary purpose of
which is to prevent consumer deception. However, such a presumption
may be unwarranted, as liability for trademark infringement is no longer
necessarily tied to the likelihood of consumer confusion at the point of
sale.83
Protection of the public, specifically "so that [the public] may be
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark
which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
which it wants to get," is one of the primary justifications for the
existence of trademark law. 84 When an infringer passes off his goods as
those of the trademark holder, the public is injured as a result.
Consumers are defrauded because, due to the infringement, they are
tricked into buying the infringer's goods, which are typically lower in
quality than the goods sold by the trademark holder. Moreover,
trademark infringement increases consumer search costs by diminishing
the value of the trademark as a source identifier. In other words, if
consumers cannot trust that all goods bearing the trademark will be
produced by the trademark holder and, as a result, be of a certain nature
and quality, then they will have to engage in other forms of research to
identify the products they wish to buy.85 As these theories demonstrate,
in a traditional case of trademark infringement the public benefits from
the issuance of injunctive relief.
81. See, e.g., Re/Max N. Cent., Inc., 272 F.3d at 433 (devoting one sentence of analysis to
issue of public interest); Int'l Jensen, Inc., 4 F.3d at 827 (affirming district court decision that,
where there was no likelihood of confusion, there was no public interest in granting the injunction);
Harris Research, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (devoting one sentence of analysis to public interest:
"Infringement and dilution of trademarks are inherently contrary to the public interest."); Am. Dairy
Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn. 1998) (also finding that
"[ijinfringement and dilution of trademarks are inherently contrary to the public interest").
82. See supra note 84.
83. See supra note 69 [notes 70-71 and accompanying text, and infra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text].
84. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79 h Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) (legislative history of the Lanham Act).
85. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 36, at 1797-99 (2007) (explaining economic theory of
trademarks and the manner in which infringement destroys a mark's ability to reduce consumer
search costs); see also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942) (explaining the manner in which trademarks reduce consumer search costs).
[2:163
18
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 2 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol2/iss1/8
2008] IP REMEDIES AFTER EBAY: ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON TRADEMARK LAW 181
However, as trademark law has drifted away from its focus on
consumer protection, the reflexive assumption that the public is served
by the issuance of injunctive relief has become less valid, at least as to
certain types of infringement.86 Initial interest confusion cases are a
prime example. As discussed above, when liability is based on a theory
of initial interest confusion, the consumer's "confusion" may be fleeting,
at best, and nonexistent when the consumer actually buys the relevant
good or service. Moreover, in the Internet context, imposition of a
permanent injunction barring use of a trademark as a metatag may
reduce the consumer's ability to comparison shop. Suppression of
competition benefits the trademark holder, at least in the short term, but
harms the consumer.
Similarly, the doctrine of secondary or post-sale confusion at least
arguably exists to protect the reputation of the trademark holder rather
than any interest on the part of the consumer. 87 In this context, as with
initial interest confusion, infringement does not occur at the point of
sale. In fact, in the post-sale context, the consumer of the relevant good
or service is not confused at all. Rather, the "infringement" occurs when
other people view the product after the sale and are confused into
thinking that it was produced by the trademark holder. For example, a
person who buys a relatively inexpensive imitation of an expensive
clock, which is clearly labeled as such, is not confused at the point of
purchase. The consumer wants to buy a cheap clock that looks like the
more expensive version, and that's what she gets. When her neighbors
see the clock in her home, they may be unable to tell whether it's the real
thing or the cheap copy. Under the theory of post-sale confusion, this
type of confusion is actionable, in part because the trademark holder's
goodwill may be injured if the neighbors mistake the cheap clock for the
real thing.88 As with initial interest confusion, the potential harm to the
public in this context lies in the impact on competition. The right to
copy is the essence of the right to compete, and when the right to copy is
not prohibited by patent or copyright law, the courts should be cautious
in limiting that right via trademark law. The public suffers when
limitations are placed on legitimate forms of competition.
86. See supra note 69 [notes 70-71 and accompanying text, and infra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text].
87. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358
(6th Cir. 2006); Ferrrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts Motor Co., 944 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1992); Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1986); Mastercrafters
Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constatin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1955).
88. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co., 221 F.2d 464.
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4. Conclusion
In sum, the presumptions that federal courts currently apply in
assessing remedies in trademark infringement cases are understandable
and intuitive in the context of the traditional case: one in which a
defendant uses a copy of plaintiffs mark to mislead the public into
thinking that his goods or services are those of the plaintiff. However,
as many forms of trademark infringement have evolved to shift away
from this model, "district courts [should] determine whether past
practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them." 89
C. eBay's effect on remedies under the TDRA
As recently amended, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
(TDRA) provides that a trademark holder "shall be entitled to injunctive
relief' upon a showing of likelihood of dilution, "subject to the
principles of equity." 90 In this context as well, the courts have tended to
presume irreparable injury and provide scant analysis as to the remainder
of the four equitable factors iterated in eBay. Many of these
presumptions are not likely to withstand critical analysis.
As in trademark infringement cases, many courts have held that a
showing of likelihood of success on the merits as to a dilution claim (or
an actual finding of dilution or likelihood of dilution) supports a
presumption of irreparable harm. 91 Many of these cases simply state the
presumption without justifying it by providing theoretical support.92
Articulating a theory that explains the manner in which a trademark
holder is harmed by dilution, irreparably or otherwise, is no small feat.
The theory of dilution by blurring has been explained as follows:
If one small user can blur the sharp focus of the famous mark to
uniquely signify one source, then another and another small user
can and will do so. Like being stung by a hundred bees,
significant injury is caused by the cumulative effect.... This is
consistent with the classic view that the injury caused by
89. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1841-42 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing this idea in the context of patent law).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
91. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Irreparable harm is generally presumed in cases of trademark infringement and dilution."); Am.
Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that
"proof of a likelihood of dilution of a mark will support a presumption of irreparable harm");
Minnesota Mining and Manuf'g Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn. 1998)
("Irreparable harm exists, as a matter of law, where there is trademark infringement or dilution.")
92. See supra note 95.
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dilution is the gradual diminution or whittling away of the value
of the famous mark by blurring uses by others.
93
The problem with this theory of dilution, at least in the context of
assessing equitable relief, is that there is little evidence to support the
claim that an individual instance of alleged dilution - which admittedly
results in no consumer confusion 94 - inflicts a tiny but irreparable injury
to the distinctiveness of the mark. As noted above in the context of
infringement actions, trademark holders can and do place a value on the
goodwill associated with their trademarks. If trademark holders cannot
demonstrate any actual injury to that goodwill as a result of dilution,
their failure to do so may simply reflect that no injury has occurred, or,
alternatively, that the injury is too minute to be measured. In any event,
the courts should do more than simply presume irreparable harm in the
context of dilution actions. Even if the court accepts the traditional
theory proffered above - that one act of dilution (or the likelihood
thereof) results in a tiny harm that will become significant if multiplied
by a hundred - the diminutive nature of that harm should be recognized
when balancing or weighing the respective harm(s) to be suffered by
each party as a result of granting injunctive relief.
In dilution cases, as in trademark infringement cases, district courts
are required to "balance the harms" when considering a request for an
injunction. However, once the court has determined that actual or a
likelihood of dilution exists, it is highly unlikely to find that the
presumed irreparable harm to the plaintiff is outweighed by any harm
imposed on the defendant as a result of enjoining his use of the allegedly
diluting trademark. When trademark infringement and dilution claims
are alleged together in the same action, as they often are, courts typically
do not balance the harms separately in the context of the dilution claim.95
In the dilution context as well, courts should not presume that the
balance of hardships weighs in the plaintiffs favor merely because
plaintiff has prevailed or demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
93. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004); see also General Motors
Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (specifying that injunctive relief is to be awarded for uses of a
mark that are "likely to cause dilution," "regardless of the presence of absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.")
95. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., 233 F.3d at 469 (affirming, in one sentence, district court's
balance of harms in the context of trademark infringement and dilution claims); Am. Dairy Queen
Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 730 (assessing balance of harms without distinguishing between trademark
infringement and dilution claims); Minnesota Mining and Manuf'g Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1005
(assessing balance of harms without distinguishing between trademark infringement and dilution
claims).
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merits, particularly given the likely small degree of harm imposed by the
allegedly diluting use of the mark.
Perhaps the most controversial presumption contained in the case
law regarding injunctive relief in dilution cases relates to the factor of
public interest. When courts discuss this factor they have been likely to
presume, as a matter of law, that trademark dilution harms the public.96
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the prohibitions
against trademark dilution... are not motivated by an interest in
protecting consumers. 97  Dilution has been characterized as treading
"very close to granting rights in gross in a trademark., 98  Because
dilution does not depend on the presence or absence of consumer
confusion, some courts have reasoned that it "only exists to protect the
quasi-property rights a holder has in maintaining the integrity and
distinctiveness of his mark."99 Given the nature of the dilution cause of
action, therefore, the presumption that injunctive relief in such cases will
always be in the public interest is unfounded.
In sum, eBay should, at a minimum, signal to district courts that
they should not presume that every prevailing plaintiff in a trademark
dilution case is entitled to an injunction absolutely prohibiting the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark. The logic supporting the
presumption of an entitlement to this form of injunctive relief derives
from traditional notions of trademark law, not the propertized (and
recently federalized) law of dilution. As in the trademark infringement
context, district courts should "determine whether past practice fits the
circumstances of the cases before them."' 00
III. CONCLUSION
In eBay, the Supreme Court instructed the courts to dispense with
formulaic analysis of requests for injunctive relief in patent cases and,
96. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., 233 F.3d at 469 (concluding that "the public interest is served by
the injunction [based on infringement and dilution] because enforcement of the trademark laws
prevents consumer confusion"); Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1169 (D.
Utah 2007) ("Infringement and dilution of trademarks are inherently contrary to the public
interest."); Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (also finding that "[i]nfringement and
dilution of trademarks are inherently contrary to the public interest").
97. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418,429 (2003).
98. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999); see generally
Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PiTT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
99. Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
100. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1841-42 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing this idea in the context of patent law).
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instead, to balance the equities of each individual case.10' In doing so it
suggested - based on the reasoning stated in the concurrences - that
while these historical presumptions are based on sound logic, due to
changes in the facts (the existence of patent trolls) and in patent law
itself (the prevalence of business method patents), they have not
withstood the test of time. For similar reasons, the courts should apply
the same careful scrutiny when evaluating requests for injunctive relief
in trademark infringement and dilution cases. The notion that a finding
of trademark infringement or dilution necessarily requires imposition of
a particular type of injunction - one that completely bars defendant from
using the offending mark - is based on a traditional conception of
trademark law grounded in the common law of unfair competition. As
trademark law has expanded and evolved into a property-like right of the
trademark holder, as reflected in doctrines such as dilution and initial
interest confusion, the equitable presumptions underlying this conclusion
should be challenged. An eBay-inspired revised approach would
represent an improvement over the status quo.
101. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
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